MIGRANTS AND THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES:  A STUDY OF NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA SINCE 1999 by Adejumo, Theophilus Oyime et al.
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Volume 7 · Number 3 · 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 196 
 
    Copyright © 2021 The Author/s                   
    This work is licensed under a CC-BY 3.0 License 
    Peer review method: Double-Blind  
    Accepted: August 08, 2021 
    Published: September 21, 2021 
    Original scientific article 




MIGRANTS AND THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS 
AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES:  
A STUDY OF NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA SINCE 1999 
 
Theophilus Oyime Adejumo* 
Department of Political Science at the University of Calabar, Nigeria  
ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6275-5201   
theophilusoyime@gmail.com 
 
Owa Egbara Owa 
Department of Political Science at the University of Calabar, Nigeria  
ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4554-5568     
owaegbaraowa001@gmail.com 
 
Ojie Abang Peter 
Department of Political Science at the University of Calabar, Nigeria  




Abstract: This study examines the effects of the proliferation of SALWs on the security of the Nigerian state. Although this issue 
has seldom been tackled in regular or academic literature, it reflects the author‟s keen awareness that, in an era of globalization, 
migrants have been identified as important agents in the proliferation of SALWs into third-world countries. The paper seeks to 
provide an insight into the socio-economic and political variables operating in the source and destination of such movements, 
with particular emphasis on migrants and arms proliferation. The study uses the qualitative approach for data analysis, it relies on 
upon, data gathered through secondary sources, and is reinforced with the argument on the liberal theoretical framework of 
analysis. The paper concludes that, while weapons play a significant role in intensifying conflict that exerts enormous human and 
economic costs, the causes of such conflicts lie in political, economic, ethnic, and religious differences and disparities. Finally, the 
paper looks at the appropriateness of examining the full implications of SALWs as a border management theme and the role of 
complementary measures for facilitating border control. 
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The subject matter of migration is central to the history of a people. This explains 
why in an attempt to understand the history of a people, where they come from, how 
they left where they come from, and why, are unavoidable questions to which answers 
must be provided. By migration here, we mean the movement of people from one place 
to another. Such movement is underpinned by the interplay of socio-economic and 
political variables operating in the source and destination of the movements. This is 
largely due to its tremendous impact on many contemporary global issues with far-
reaching implications for the international system particularly in an era of mounting 
environmental concerns, rapid technological breakthrough, widening political 
participation, and constantly redefined ideologies and political behavior among others, 
have in many ways, intensified human migration. Issues such as world peace and 
security, population drift and international labor mobility, growing pressure on world‟s 
natural resources, poverty, environmental degradation, and natural calamities, the 
international migration crisis, refugees and humanitarian needs, international crimes and 
syndicate, unemployment, territorial claims, and boundary disputes, power rivalry, 
famine, conflict, insecurity,  porous borders, injustices, arms trafficking, armed banditry, 
activities of fundamentalists and forces of globalization. If relates to Nigeria, one would 
realize that they are prevalent and have serious consequences. 
This study mirrors the author‟s strong cognizance that in an era of globalization, 
migrants have been recognized as important agents in the proliferation of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons (SALWs) into third-world countries. Nowhere is this assertion more 
apt than in Nigeria, especially in the north-eastern part of the country, where the 
activities of religious fundamentalists (Boko Haram, Islamic sect, the Fulani herders, and 
armed bandits) have plagued that part of the country into the worse socio-economic 
and political crisis the country has witnessed since the civil war. Scholars such as 
Theophilus (2019), Theophilus (2020), Olasile (2015), MuhammedLadan (2012), Malam 
(2014), Edeko (2011), Omede (2011), Okafor (2017), Ibeanu (2015), Small Arms Survey 
(2005), have aptly observed that people are directly affected by small arms use before, 
during and after conflicts. They further highlighted that SALWs proliferation sustains and 
worsens violent conflicts that threaten the functions of legitimate governments, as well 
as the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, these explanations can best be 
understood within the context of globalization and porous borders, which have 
catalyzed the movement of people and goods across international borders. 
In tackling the problem of migration and SALW's proliferation, the Nigerian state 
depended on the following steps, as demonstrated by the establishment of the National 
Commission for the Control of Proliferation and Unlawful Circulation of Light Weapons 
(NATCOM) for the implementation of the ECOWAS moratorium in July 2006. The 
government also established the Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security 
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and Development (PCASED) in March of that year. Similarly, the Nigerian state has also 
been cooperating with neighboring states such as Niger, Chad, Benin Republic, and 
Cameroon on cross-border crime to enhance security on Nigeria's international borders 
by the police, customs, and immigration officers to check the movement of people in 
and out of Nigeria. Globally, Nigeria is a signatory to the United Nations Fire Arms 
Protocol of November 13, 2001, which was ratified on July 15, 2004. 
Equally, a myriad of other groups – IGOs/NGOs, AU (African Union), SAD (South 
African Development Agency), WANSA (West African Network on Small Arms), Civil 
Society Organisations, etc. have all taken major steps to find an effective and lasting 
solution to address the problem of migration and arms proliferation. Unfortunately, 
despite the existence of regional, continental and international instruments designed to 
curb the spread of SALWs from neighboring states into North-Eastern Nigeria, the 
country has continued to witness the influx in geometric terms of SALWs by illegal 
immigrants. Without going into a detailed analysis yet, it is imperative to provide a brief 
historical background of the study areas to provide a basis for the understanding of this 
paper. The political zone referred to as North-Eastern Nigeria comprises the states of 
Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. Ibrahim (2012) argued that the area 
that constitutes the North-Eastern Zone of Nigeria lies between the vast and expanse of 
the Sahara and the dense tropical rainforest along the Guinean coast. Delimiting the 
area is Cameroon to the east, Niger and the Chad Republic to the North, North-Central 
Nigeria on the West, and South-Eastern Nigeria to the South. According to Nyako 
Abdul-Aziz (2015), the North-East occupies slightly less than one-third of Nigeria‟s total 
area and has a projected population of 23,558,674 or 13.5% of the country‟s population. 
This important location has profound implications for the country‟s security strategies 
ranging from immigration policy, customs and, labor laws. The paper presented by 
Muhammed T. Ladanin (2012), points to the fact that, since 1985, the North-East has 
retained the title of the poorest zone in Nigeria, with the highest incidence of poverty 
(ranging between 54.99% - 72.2%). It is also the zone with the highest number of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), totaling 11,360 in the first quarter of 2012 and 2010–
2011 with the highest number of forced displacement of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) (approximately 22% or 82,000). Moreover, the North-East has also been described 
as the home or paradox of Boko-Haram (literally transmitted „Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunna 
Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad) an armed group that promotes sectarian violence of different 
dimensions that have engulfed the entire region, in the history of Nigeria – that is, 
neither inter- nor intra-religious but essentially against the Western-educated Muslim 
elite and government. In his presentation, Muhammed T. Ladan further argued that it is 
a paradox such a movement that is opposed to the acquisition of knowledge emerged 
in Borno State, the capital of Kanem-Borno Empire and the first Islamic state in pre-
colonial Nigeria that was established based on knowledge and excellence in scholarship, 
resulting in the movement distortion. He argued further that, it is a paradox that such a 
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situation should emanate from the minds of those who believe that they are asserting 
their religious identity, reforming Islam and restoring it to its pristine purity by maiming 
and killing innocent residents, destroying property, and rupturing peace. This explains 
why from a historical perspective, the zone shares geographical proximity and cultural 
affinities, which makes migration across the existing borders easy. The Hausa-Fulani-
Kanem-Borno cut into Nigeria, Niger and Chad. These characteristics make this zone 
vulnerable to migrants and illegal trafficking in SALWs. It is based on this that one can 
understand the changing nature of the security scenario in West Africa and North-




Causes and Channels of SALWs Proliferation  
 
In the course of this study, several works which contain relevant information on 
the origin, causes, transit, destination, threat, and risk of SALWs to the security of states 
in Africa and Nigeria in particular, in the period under review, have been consulted. 
However, Theophilus (2020), Okafor (2017), Banko (2016), Lamptey (2013), Onwuka 
(2010), Hazeban and Horner (2007), Abdel-Fatau (2002), Kofi (2002), among others have 
undertaken a comprehensive discussion on this. According to them, the Nigerian state 
has been and is still being threatened on many fronts by violence that is being 
perpetrated with the use of small arms and light weapons, which are freely deployed. 
There are rarely any geopolitical zones of Nigeria without its major share of arms-
related threats to peace, security, and development that is either ongoing or recently 
resolved. Okafor (2017) and Theophilus (2020) acknowledged the view that several 
works contain relevant information on the origin, causes, sources, transit, and 
destination of SALWs in Nigeria in general, and the North-Eastern states, in particular, 
have been consulted. Onwuka (2010) has argued that trafficking by migrants is not 
entirely new in the global discourse. He however argued further that, the focus on it 
took an unprecedented turn at the end of the Cold War when the iron curtain across 
Europe was dismantled. Therefore, with the triumph of free markets and the 
enthronement of unipolar political and economic world view, arms trade experienced 
phenomenal deregulation. This deregulation process promoted exponentially the 
availability of SALWs in Africa at costs that were suddenly affordable to those who 
hitherto stood no chance of procuring the weapons. Along the same line, Abdel-Fatau 
(2002) argued that, in Africa, factors responsible for the proliferation of SALWs are many 
and varied. While the thrust of international efforts to curb proliferation tends to 
concentrate on the manufacture and supply of new weapons. Accordingly, he further 
noted, a major pipeline remains the stockpiles that were pumped into Africa in the 
1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s by the ex-Soviet Union, the USA, and allies to fan proxy 
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intra-state and inter-state wars. Equally, Banko‟s (2016) central argument is that those 
left-over weapons have found their way through clandestine networks involving illegal 
migrants, rogue arms brokers, private military companies, and shady airline companies, 
such as Victor Bout, who owns five (5) airlines that flew sixty (60) aircraft and employed 
some three hundred (300) migrants who serve as a network provider in bridging the gap 
in the chain of supply of arms to destination points, and Leonid Effimonich, a major 
broker and dealer in arms, indicted over the proliferation of arms in West Africa, as well 
as Geza Mezosy, a Belgian who established a company, „Eastronition‟ through which he 
sold illegal arms across Belgium, Luxembourg and Hungary, and ran dirty arms deals 
and sponsored many cliques and merchants of arms dealers and gangs to exacerbate 
ongoing conflicts and facilitate the start of new ones in the continent. 
In Nigeria‟s Niger Delta region, Henry Okah, MEND‟s leader, is a known arms 
broker with great leverage and monopoly of sorts over the Nigeria-South Africa arms 
trafficking axis. A report credited to GIABA in 2013, noted that Asari Dokubo, another 
MEND leader, once reported that Okah had supplied him arms, including AK-47s, 
general-purpose machine guns, cans of bullets, G3, and RPGs to conduct a series of 
violent attacks against government targets in the Niger-Delta. 
Hazebn and Horner's (2007) position is that, although the operations of these 
and similar groups are shrouded in mystery, their activities supported corrupt regimes, 
contributed to the use of child soldiers, and fuelled endless wars and insurrection in 
West Africa. These, according to Hazebn and Horner, are common occurrences in 
Nigeria, as was the case in most other countries including Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, 
Egypt, Yemen, etc. 
In all, it must be acknowledged that the breakup and deregulation of arms 
industries in Eastern and Central Europe have also led to the mushrooming of mini-arm 
industries in Africa whose aggressive search for new markets in the developing world 
has made nonsense of existing export regimes. Africa itself boasts of countries that are 
arms manufacturers - South Africa, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Morocco, and Nigeria, among 
others, are countries dotted with growing SALW's cottage industries. As a consequence, 
small arms have found their way into civilian hands from official sources due to a 
combination of factors, including the breakdown of the state structures, lax controls 
over national armories, and poor service conditions for security personnel. 
This horrifying situation has led Langumba (2010) to further acknowledge that; 
“the widespread availability of small arms to abusive actors poses a threat of 
unprecedented magnitude to West Africa, far greater than that of HIV/AIDS in terms of 
its socio-economic and human consequences”. Put simply; 
small arms and light weapons constitute a category of weapons 
responsible for most of today‟s conflict casualties and human rights 
abuses worldwide. Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue, it 
is also an issue of human rights and development. The proliferation of 
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SALWs sustains and intensifies armed conflicts. It endangers peacekeepers 
and workers. It undermines respect for international humanitarian laws; it 
threatens legitimate but weak governments and it benefits terrorists as 
well as the perpetrators of organized crime (Kofi 2002). 
 
Lamptey (2013) established the fact that, following the radicalization processes 
and the collapse of state structures that characterize the Arab Spring, loosened up 
weapons became easily available to leaders of the present militant groups in Nigeria 
who found fertile enclaves for training in these countries. It must however be 
established that these weapons were massively brought into Nigeria for use in most 
insurgencies, especially the Boko Haram upheaval, armed banditry, Fulani herders. It is 
glaring from reports of the Nigerian military in Sambisa forest, that there were skilled 
mercenaries who came into Nigeria along with these arms to train recruits on the use 
and operation of these SALWs. Nagbanton Patrick in GIABA Report (2013) reaffirmed 
this argument that Boko Haram acquires arms from Niger, Chad, and Cameroon – 
countries that share borders with Nigeria in the northern part of the country. Nigeria‟s 
extensive borders with Cameroon, notorious as smuggling routes for illicit SALWs, 
perfectly serves the purpose of Boko Haram, especially with the Northeast being its 
primary base. With most of its original members hailing from the northeast, the group 
easily facilitates the flow of illicit SALWs from Chad into Nigeria. Indeed, the use of AK-
47 rifles to carry out attacks is an indication that most of the arms used by the group 
were smuggled into the country. For instance, during the April 2011 general elections, 
the police and other security agencies recovered and seized 3 AK-47 rifles and other 
arms from Boko Haram in a raid in Maiduguri. The group also uses locally manufactured 
firearms and produces explosives in one of its hideouts in Bauchi State (Next 
Newspaper, 4 August 2009). The cases of looted state arsenals by civilians, whether in 
Albania in 1977, Uganda in 1979, or Iraq in 2003, emphasize how easily small arms 
quickly enter the illicit sphere and become difficult to track. They easily percolate 
because they are small arms, easy to buy, use and conceal. Their proliferation intensifies 
conflict, sparks refugee flows, undermines the rule of law, and spawns a culture of 
violence and impunity. These looted arms end up, one way or another, in vulnerable 
countries like Nigeria. In the same vein, Oshita (2010) observed that, through some 
peace missions involving the Nigerian military in the West African sub-region, many of 
SALWs come into wide circulation in the country. It is widely held that some discharged 
soldiers from war zones in Liberia and Sierra Leone had returned to the country with 
various types of ammunition used in wartime, and sold weapons in the country for 
cheap money. Indeed, some weapons captured by the police from criminals, migrants, 
and militia members have been identified to these various peace mission exercises in 
the sub-region. Having recognized the corrosive effects of SALWs proliferation on 
human and physical development in Nigeria, Imobighe Thomas in Edeko Sunday (2011) 
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reported that there are many reasons why Nigeria is such a willing and functional 
receptacle or repository of SALWs. Borders inherited by Nigeria are badly demarcated, 
hence they are easily crossed. These boundaries were arbitrarily drawn by European 
imperialists who colonized almost the entire African continent. In his report, he noted 
that a tour of the Nigerian borders in September 1984 by Nigerian Immigration officials 
in Sokoto revealed that there were more than 1,500 illegal entry points along Nigeria‟s 
border with Benin and Niger. He further reported that Nigeria shares a long stretch of 
land border with the Republic of Niger and Chad in the North, Benin Republic in the 
West, and Cameroon in the East, in addition to a long stretch of Atlantic coastline. Each 
of these frontiers provides entry points for systematic smuggling of arms into the 
country. 
Banko (2016) aligns with the view that currently in Nigeria, it is on record that the 
two most notorious arms smuggling frontiers in Nigeria are Idi-Iroko and Seme in the 
South-Western state of Lagos. One may not know the statistics of SALWs in circulation 
in Nigeria, but one indisputable fact is that the percentage is high. Other reported 
countries from which illegal weapons and ammunition are sourced include Cote d‟Ivoire, 
Liberia, South Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Serbia. While 
source countries are often named, the flow of SALWs from source and transit countries 
is not well documented. 
Nigerian state in general and the North-Eastern states, in particular, are riddled 
with abject poverty, high unemployment rate, social deprivation and injustice, pollution, 
and underdevelopment. The synergy between the aforesaid has created a breeding 
ground for non-state armed groups, organized crime and illicit trafficking, and the 
proliferation of SALWs. Put differently, because the Nigerian youths remain permanently 
agitated and anxious about the future, they resort to „any means possible or available‟ to 
eke a living. This anchored on a general culture of impunity and crass materialism 
heightens crime, especially amongst a young generation that feels hopeless and 
helpless. It is precisely in this scenario that the search for and acquisition of SALWs is 
construed as the sure means of opening doors to a better tomorrow by these frustrated 
and misguided youths. 
This situation is worsened by the failure of the government to provide the much-
needed security is a factor that compels citizens to look for an alternative. Several 
studies have shown that lack of confidence in security forces or the inability of security 
agencies to carry out their duty effectively in many African countries and Nigeria, in 
particular, informed the strong need by citizens to acquire arms to protect themselves 
and their property from armed violence. In addition to the failure of the government to 
provide the much-needed security, Africa is equally laden by the devastating impacts of 
climate change, which will heighten the threat to regional security, most especially in 
West Africa. Jakkie Cilliers in Okafor (2017) noted that climate change presents humanity 
with its largest challenges in recorded history. Its predicted effects over the coming 
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decades include extreme weather events, droughts, flooding, rising sea levels that could 
affect countries such as Nigeria and Mozambique …changes in habitats, and increased 
spread of life-threatening diseases such as malaria. Today Africa is home to the most 
rapid levels of population growth and urbanization in the world and will shortly have 
more people than China. Already it is inhabited by 14 percent of the world‟s human 
population. Africa will inevitably face greater challenges owing to climate change than 
any other region. 
Lastly, the forces of globalization bring opportunities and challenges. The 
increasing and complex global system of production and exchange, and the elimination 
of state-enforced restrictions on the movement of goods and services across borders, 
further complicate the challenges of containing SALWs proliferation.  
 
Table 1: Types, Sources, Routes, and Destinations of SALW in West Africa (Source: GIABA Report 2013) 
 
Country of Destination 
or Use 
Types of SALW Likely Countries of 
Origin/Suppliers 
Means/Routes 
Niger AK-47 guns, pistols, 
short, long, and double-
barrel guns, Beretta 
guns, and Kalashnikov 
rifles 
Libya, Chad, Somali, 
Sudan, Nigeria, Algeria, 
Burkina Faso, and local 
manufacturers 
Land borders and 
footpaths 
Guinea Bissau AK-47 guns, pistols, 
short, long, and double-
barrel guns 
Remnants from the 
independence struggle, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and local manufacturers 
Land and sea borders 
Cote d‟Ivoire AK-47 guns, pistols, 
revolvers, assault rifles, 
short, long, and double-
barrel guns 
Liberia, Guinea, USA, 
Britain, Russia, France, 
China, and local 
manufacturers 
Land and sea borders 
Nigeria (Niger Delta, 
North-East) 
Pump-action guns, AK-
47 guns, revolvers, self-
loading guns, assault 
rifles, pistols, short, long, 
and double-barrel guns 
Chad, Cameroon, South 
Africa, Europe, Nigeria 
Military and police 
officers, local 
manufacturers, Great 
Lakes region, and Russia 
Land and sea borders, 
creeks, and airstrips 
Togo AK-47 guns, local 
pistols, and long rifles, 
pistols, short, long, and 
double-barrel guns 




Ghana Pistols, AK-47 guns, 
revolvers, pump-action 
guns, short, long, and 
double-barrel guns 
Remnants of the military 
era and local 
manufacturers 
 
Sierra Leone AK-47 guns, revolvers, 
rockets, self-loading 
Guinea, Liberia, Cote 
d‟Ivoire, remnants of the 
Land, sea borders, and 
footpaths through 
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pistols, rifles, assault 
rifles, locally made guns, 
mortars, and hand 
grenades 
civil war, and local 
manufacturers 
Guinean forest 
Liberia AK-47 guns, revolvers, 
self-loading pistols, 
rifles, assault rifles, 
locally made guns, 
mortars, and hand 
grenades 
Guinea, Burkina Faso, 
East Europe, Libya, 
remnants of the civil 
war, local manufacturers 
Land and sea borders 
Senegal  
(Casamance Region) 
AK-47 guns, pistols, 
rockets, short, long, and 
double-barrel guns 
Guinea Bissau, Gambia, 
Iran, and local 
manufacturers 
Land borders, maritime 
borders, and footpaths 
Gambia AK-47 guns, pistols, 
rockets, short, long, and 
double-barrel guns 
Local manufacturers, 
Iran and Senegal 
Land and sea borders 
Burkina Faso AK-47 guns, revolvers, 
self-loading pistols, 
rifles, assault rifles, and 
locally made guns 
Liberia, Cote d‟Ivoire 
and local manufacturers 
Land borders and 
footpaths 
Guinea AK-47 guns, local 
pistols, and long rifles, 
short, long, and double-
barrel guns 
Local manufacturers, 
Cote d‟Ivoire, Sierra 
Leone, and Liberia 
Land and sea borders 
Cape Verde AK-47 guns, revolvers, 
assault rifles, long and 
double barrel guns 
Europe and local 
manufacturing 
Sea borders 
Benin AK-47 guns, revolvers, 
assault rifles, long and 
double barrel guns 
Nigeria, Togo, South 
Africa 
Land and sea borders 
Mali AK-47 guns, revolvers, 
assault rifles, long and 
double barrel guns 
Local manufacturers, 
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Existing Control Measures on Arms Tracing/Proliferation  
 
It has been argued severally at different fora that political instability and security 
in West Africa and Nigeria are driven by the untamed movement of SALWs in the 
region. This trend constitutes a major humanitarian challenge and crisis in the region. It 
has been observed that the availability and easy procurement of SALWs by non-state 
actors, especially warmongers and human rights abuses are, to a large extent, 
responsible for a great number of civilian causalities in West African civil conflict, and 
nay Africa at large (Koroma 1999). Thus, the proliferation of SALWs is a major challenge 
across the globe. 
Given this, the international community under the auspices of the United Nations 
has explicitly noted that arms tracing remains a critical component of any meaningful 
collective response to addressing the challenges posed by the illicit proliferation of 
SALWs. This according to Okafor (2017) was the basis for the negotiation and adoption 
of a distinct International Tracing Instrument (ITI) titled “the international instrument to 
enable states to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit SALWs in 
December by 2005 by the Member States of the UN. 
Evaluating SALWs control measures initiated by various regional bodies, the West 
African sub-regional organization amplified the importance of tracing in the ECOWAS 
convention on SALWs, signifying an endorsement of the earlier position of member-
states in all the UN arms control instruments. The instruments apportioned critical 
responsibility on states bearing in mind that the military-industrial complexes that 
manufactured these weapons are being housed by states. Therefore, as a requirement 
for an effective arm-tracing, the state has to ensure that arms manufactured within its 
jurisdiction are properly marked.  
Bah (2004) argued that the ECOWAS moratorium is one of such initiatives 
targeted at solving the security challenges posed by the proliferation of SALWs. In 
recognition of the danger that the proliferation of illicit small arms poses to the security 
of the nation. He argued further that ECOWAS under the stewardship of Mali which had 
undertaken successful peace negotiations with Tuareg rebels adopted a moratorium on 
the importation, exportation, and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West 
Africa.  
Put differently, in 2006 this was transformed into a legally binding instrument – 
the ECOWAS Convention on SALWs, which came into force on September 29, 2009. In 
2006, the ECOWAS Commission also launched a small arms program (ECOSAP) based in 
Bamako, Mali, as a capacity-building program for member-states and civil society 
organizations to deal with the problem of proliferation. To help implement and monitor 
ECOWAS policy and regulation on the issue, it established a Small Arms Division within 
the commission.  
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Although thirty-five years after the adoption in 1979, protocol relating to the free 
movement of persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment, several factors are still 
impeding effective inter-regional mobility within the ECOWAS region. Member states 
face a significant delay in transposing the 1979 protocol and supplementary protocols 
into law. While the right of entry and the abolition of visa requirements for a 90-day stay 
have been implemented in all countries, less progress can be noted regarding the Right 
of Residence, the Right of Establishment, and access to employment. 
West Africa is characterized by – among other factors – a fast-growing 
population and steadily increasing urbanization. These factors affect migration patterns 
in the region and require collective responses by member-states that work together in 
the framework of the regional integration process launched almost forty years ago 
through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, recently, 
member states have shown a growing interest and readiness to handle challenges 
related to migration as well as to better take advantage of the inherent development 
potential of migration (ECOWAS Report, 2016). 
At the 33rd ordinary session of Heads of States and Government of ECOWAS 
member states in January 2008, the ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration was 
officially endorsed. The key principle of the common approach is the free movement of 
persons within ECOWAS is key to the integration policy of the commission that regular 
migration towards other regions of the world contributes to the development of 
ECOWAS member states, hence the need to control irregular migration, SALWs 
trafficking, and human trafficking – particularly of women and children – and to 




The establishment of an appropriate theoretical framework is an imperative 
necessity in any oriented research, not only because of the explanatory power of 
theories but also because such a theoretical frame would provide a guide that would 
enhance the understanding of the work as a whole. In this regard, two theories are used 
in this study: Realism and Liberalism. 
The epistemic value of Realism is rooted in the assumption it makes: first, the 
states are the only actors in the international system; and second, the international 
environment is anarchic. This sense of anarchy is not that it lacks order or is chaotic, but 
that it lacks a world government with the potency to guarantee the security of states. 
Therefore, in a bid to guarantee her security, bolster its security and political power, 
states strive to safeguard their security by arms build-up. This explains why Morgenthau 
(1943) defines international politics as the struggle for power. It must however be 
emphasized that the lack of a world government as mentioned earlier does not imply 
the absence of international law, but the extent to which states will accept or reject 
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international law will be to the extent to which they are willing to accept the 
consequences of such acceptance or rejection. Exponents of Realism include Kennan 
(1954), Morgenthau (1943), Kegley (1994), Waltz (1979) among others; framed an 
intellectual movement whose ideas and beliefs about the international system were 
opposed to idealism. In their conceptualization, the world is anarchy – a threat system in 
which force remains the ultima ratio, the “basis of diplomacy and all the contractual 
obligations beyond the boundaries of the state” (Theophilus 2019). As Michael Howard 
in Bassey (2012, 452) has argued, the “capacity of states to defend themselves and their 
evident willingness to do so, provides the basic framework within which the business of 
international negotiations is carried on”. 
The aim of Realism in this work is to show that, contrary to the conventional view 
inherited from the cold war era, whether developed or less developed nations, all are 
vulnerable to the security threat. What can be deduced from an analysis of the 
foregoing is that the manufacturing of arms by developed nations, to safeguard their 
security can at best can explain why weapons are proliferated to developing nations. 
GIABA Report of 2013 shows that most of the so-called small arms and light weapons 
used in recent conflicts are manufactured by the big industrialized nations. In 
Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban make use of Russian and American-made AK-47, 
RPG 7, USM 72, and automatic rifles. 
A major deficiency of Realism is its assumption that states are the only actors in 
the international system. To this extent, the proliferation will follow an asymmetrical 
relationship between states. However, while states may be major actors in the 
international system, non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, rogue arm 
brokers, private military companies, shady airline companies, and local smugglers, play a 
critical role when it comes to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons across 
nations, to exacerbate ongoing conflicts and facilitate the commencement of new ones 
in the continent.  
From the above perspective, there is no doubt that Realism has a pessimistic view 
of the international system. Given the prevailing patterns of conflicts in inter-state 
relations, characterized by incessant competition, states are seen as the defining 
element of global reality. Accordingly, all necessary weapons are easily deployed by 
states to secure their paramountcy in the comity of nations. Hence the constant 
possibility of war and the resultant demands for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) 
in particular and other weapons of war at large. Thus, it may be said that the Realist 
theory will at best provide a necessary, but not sufficient explanation for the 
proliferation of SALWs. It is this deficiency that has necessitated this study to turn to the 
theory of Liberalism. 
On the other hand, Liberalism is a theory that relates events to their likely causes. 
The theory is predicated on an economic view: That states should take their hands off 
the production and determination of prices of basic commodities, and allow the forces 
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of demand and supply to determine prices of goods. It also advocated for the 
ownership of private properties rather than state ownership and control of the 
economy. Exponents of Liberalism including Keohane and Nye (1989), Rosenau (2004), 
John Locke, among others, have attributed the causes of the proliferation of SALWs to 
many factors: first, that the stockpiles that were pumped into Africa in the 1970s, 1980s 
and early 1990s by the ex-Soviet Union, the USA and their allies to fan proxy intra-state 
and inter-state wars. Second, the breakup and deregulation of arms industries in Eastern 
and Central Europe have led to the mushrooming of mini-industries in Africa whose 
aggressive search for new markets in the developing world have made nonsense of 
existing export regimes. For example, Africa itself boasts of countries that are arms 
manufacturers - South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, Zimbabwe, Egypt, among others, are 
countries dotted with growing SALWs cottage industries. Third, the post-cold war 
scenario, according to Robert Kaplan, „The Coming Anarchy Shattering the Dreams of 
the Post-Cold War‟, engendered severe adverse economic and political difficulties for 
many developing countries that cost their subsidies due to the sudden end of the 
regime of ideological proxies. The inability of these states to contain the new liberal 
onslaught resulted in violent intra-state conflicts. 
The relevance of Liberalism to this study is to show that, contrary to the Realist 
conception that proliferation of SALWs is enhanced by state actors, the Liberal theorists 
are of the view that the idea of privatization which is factored in the theory of Liberalism 
that has allowed and encouraged individuals and private military companies to delve 
into the production and the manufacture of SALWs and their related spare parts at costs 
that were suddenly affordable to those who hitherto stood no chance of procuring 
these weapons, intending to make profits. In the US, for instance, like other developed 
countries, the military-industrial complex has been privatized, and other smaller 
corporations are at liberty to produce weapons and spare parts. It is this growing and 
uncontrolled production and trade in SALWs in the last few years, among regions 
suffering from political instability and violent conflicts that have made individuals and 
groups vulnerable to proliferation.  
From the above, it can be said that the liberal theory is a better theory on which 
this study is anchored. For one thing, it provides a better explanation for the sources of 
proliferation (which in this case results in the privatization of the security system) and 
points to a direction in which the problem can be resolved (state taking absolute control 
and management of the security of states). From this standpoint, the study has adopted 
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RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
The data used for the analysis are based on information obtained from many 
sources. First, extensive desk research on institutional and official documents from the 
Nigerian Ministry of Defence, United Nations publications, Federal Office of Statistics, 
ECOWAS reports, and the University of Calabar library, was carried out on the policies of 
the various tiers of government as they impact on the political and peace processes in 
general, and on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in particular, gleaned 
from various primary sources including Nigerian dailies and magazines. Secondly, data 
were obtained from elaborate Focus Group Discussions and content analysis involving 
border guards agencies: Army, Navy, Police, Customs, Immigration as well as Port Health 
Service and Nigerian Agricultural Quarantine Service (NAQS), including civil society 
spokesperson and some leading members of armed groups at the Seme Border post 
between Nigeria and Republic of Benin in August 2017, further illuminated the various 
perspectives on government‟s role in the propagation of small arms and light weapons 
in Nigeria. 
The process of content analysis involved investigation, recording, and analyzing 
past events to discover generalizations that were significant in understanding the past 
and present to deal with the issues under consideration and make needful predictions 
and conclusions for the future, where applicable and necessary. The Focus Group 
Discussions clarified some of the questions that had been raised in the course of the 
desk research, and also identified areas for further research concerning the roles of state 
institutions in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria. Some 
members of the focus groups also drew the researcher‟s attention to documents on the 
internet, which they considered relevant to the subject matter.  
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
 
The Nigerian state has been and is being threatened on many fronts by violence 
that are being perpetrated with the use of small arms and light weapons, which are 
freely deployed. There is rarely any geopolitical zone of Nigeria without its major share 
of arms-related threats to peace, security, and development that is either ongoing or 
recently resolved. The underlying issues that generate these threats are internally 
induced, sometimes arising from the inherent contradictions of state-building that are 
often executed, using the instrumentality of violence. Okafor (2017) aligns with the view 
that Nigeria currently labors under the yoke of far too many conflicts of varying levels of 
intensity, and that the fault lines of these conflicts are socio-cultural even though rooted 
in the severe competition for scarce political, social, and economic resources. 
Paradoxically, while the conflict crises are driven internally, the instruments of their 
violent prosecution have predominantly remained SALWs that are sourced externally. 
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The return to democratic rule since 1999. The Nigerian state and the northeastern states, 
in particular, are increasingly ruined by the availability and easy accessibility of SALWs 
by non-state actors who are desperately pursuing their parochial interests to the 
detriment of peace, security, and development. A new dimension to the conflict trends 
in the northeast is the activities of the Fulani militants mostly herdsmen who are armed 
with SALWs and are always ready to deploy them against their perceived enemies. The 
dastardly attacks of terror using SALWs allegedly committed by Fulani herdsmen in 
recent times have received international attention with the designation of them as being 
among the five most deadly terrorist groups in the world. In 2015, the Institute for 
Economics and Peace argued that Fulani herdsmen were responsible for the death of 
over 1,229 people in 2014, and have continued to pose a serious threat to the stability 
of the country. The conflict persists over the herdsmen‟s search for access and control of 
land and water. Equally, the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa have 
been the epicenters of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The Boko Haram acclaimed by 
the 2015 Global Terrorism Index as the deadliest terrorist organization in the world, is 
renowned for the use of improvised explosive devices (IED) as well as the acquisition 
and indiscriminate use of SALWs. 
In the South-Eastern State, the impact of SALWs proliferation is felt in the 
increased incidences of kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, cultism, and communal 
crisis. For instance, the killing of people in rural communities in Enugu State by the 
Fulani herdsmen/militias has been enlisted in arms-related security challenges in the 
area. In the Niger-Delta region alone, about one hundred militant groups existed before 
the federal government‟s amnesty program (Asuni 2009). Although the North-Western 
states have been experiencing violent conflicts that showcase the lethality of SALWs in 
the hands of non-state actors, especially armed bandits, religious fundamentalists, and 
terrorists.  
Unfortunately, in all these cases, the common attribute of these non-state armed 
groups remained their easy access to and indiscriminate use of SALWs. This depicts the 
vulnerability of the civil population and further highlights the enormity of the threats 
being faced by the Nigerian state. It equally pointed to the fact that states‟ institutional 
capacity, including the civil society, in confronting these challenges are weak, thereby 
continuously making it possible for the non-state actors to freely acquire and use 
SALWs. However, Theophilus, Ndum, and Abong (2020) aptly observed that the 
consequence of these and related security threats are the intermittent outbreak of 
violent conflicts in recent times. The failure of public security in Nigeria, and perhaps in 
the North-East has led the citizens to indulge in different forms of „self-help‟ security 
measures ranging from vigilante groups to community-owned arms stockpiling. Having 
lost confidence in the Nigerian state, parties involved in some of these crises in Nigeria 
and the North-East, in particular, have become entangled in a security dilemma. The 
quest to procure more arms to guarantee personal and community protection from 
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perceived and real enemies (Boko Haram, Fulani herders, armed bandits) is fuelling the 
domestic arms race. Hence, breaking the chain of SALWs circulation has remained a 
major challenge to the Nigerian government. This unfortunate situation in turn stokes 
the demand for more arms by both the government and non-state actors to maintain 
security. While the government increases its stock through importation and local 
manufacture via the Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), non-state actors 
patronize transnational traffickers/migrants and burgeoning unregulated local and 
artisanal arms manufacturers. 
In a bid to address these security dilemmas occasioned by the illicit proliferation 
of SALWs, the Nigerian state in 2001 embraced two initiatives aiming at countering the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons were agreed within the United Nations 
framework: the legally binding protocol on Firearm to the Vienna Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime, and separately, a political document called the Program 
of Action (PoA) to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons. These agreements, which included a broad range of measures to enhance 
controls on transfers, availability, and use of small arms, were largely supply-side 
oriented. Today, there is increasing concern that controlling and regulating SALWs 
production, transfer, brokering and misuse is likely to meet with scant success if efforts 
are not made to identify and tackle the conditions that encourage people to acquire and 
use guns. Indeed, it has been observed that:  
A prominent reason for the large numbers of small arms and light 
weapons in circulation is the vigorous demand for them. Much of that 
demand is inevitably linked to criminality, individual and collective. In 
addition, however, demand for SALWs is widely linked to particular social, 
economic, and political conditions (Ernie Regehr 2004, 3).  
 
Efforts integrating both supply and demand approaches are needed to address 
the spread of small arms and light weapons effectively. This implies, in particular, 
extending the scope of action more broadly to dimensions such as insecurity, social and 
economic deprivation, and human rights abuses. An encouraging step in this direction 
was the adoption in 2005 by the UN General Assembly of Resolution 60/68, which drew 
attention to the linkages between development and small arms. Identifying the factors 
that incite people to acquire a gun and understanding the mechanisms by which the 
global proportion of gun owners evolve in a population will make small arms reduction 
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The spread of small arms and light weapons is a major policy challenge for the 
international community. In West Africa, the proliferation of SALWs has remained a 
topical issue. Small arms and light weapons facilitate and exacerbate conflicts whose 
result is large-scale migration and displacement of people and families. The paper 
acknowledged that, while these weapons play a significant role in the exacerbating 
conflict that exacts enormous human and economic costs, the causes of such conflicts 
lie in political, economic, ethnic, and religious differences and disparities. These factors 
are often aggravated by governance-related deficiencies, such as exclusionary and 
irresponsive policies and lack of or weakness in democratic institutions, respect for rule 
of law, and human rights observance. The access to porous international borders further 
compounds the problems of widespread proliferation, illicit trafficking, criminal misuse, 
and mass importation by migrants. 
The paper further reiterated that the level of conflict in Nigeria is increasing the 
demand for these weapons as many communities who have suffered defeats from other 
communities as well as fundamentalists (Boko Haram, Fulani herders, armed bandits, 
criminal gangs) prepare themselves by simply acquiring these arms from local arms 
dealers/manufacturers and arms traffickers in the name of self-protection. The role of 
these arms in fuelling conflicts cannot be overstated. Arising from these, the following 
viable options are proposed to address the issues of migration and arms trafficking that 
undermined the security of the Nigerian state. First, the Nigerian state needs to 
demonstrate a commitment not only in policy formulation, endorsement of agreements, 
and codification but also in a practical effort at implementation which is vital to carry on 
the responsibilities of providing social and economic security and development for the 
citizens. Second, the Nigerian government should be proactive in dealing with the 
rampant cross-border criminal activities that undermine its national security. There is a 
need to evolve a new approach to border security, land, sea, and air, using modern and 
sophisticated detection equipment to discourage arms trafficking through the borders 
by arms dealers/illegal migrants. This approach should include an integrated mix of 
development interventions for border communities, trained and dedicated border 
officials as well as an enhanced border situation awareness infrastructure. Put differently, 
the Federal Government of Nigeria should strengthen border security arrangements 
through enhanced intra- and inter-state collaboration among security and intelligence 
agencies in maritime and land border areas to ensure effective tracking and interdiction 
of SALWs traffickers and/or illegal migrants. Hence, the need by the Nigerian state to 
intensify effort to faithfully implement existing Conflict Prevention and Peace Building 
Strategies as contained in the National Policy on Peace and in Chapter II of the 
constitution. This would help minimize the outbreak and persistence of violent conflicts 
that stoke arms proliferation. The Federal Government of Nigeria should strengthen 
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democratic institutions and processes of governance to enhance social provision for its 
citizens, who are becoming increasingly frustrated over governance failure, thereby 
resorting to violent crimes that increase demand for SALWs. It must also extend to an 
aggressive job creation program for Nigeria‟s teeming and idle youth who are fast 
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